Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1979

State of Utah v. Eugene Andreini : Reply Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert B. Hansen; Craig L. Barlow; Attorneys for Respondent;
Phil L. Hansen; Hansen and Hansen; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State v. Andreini, No. 16518 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1770

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPR3ME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 16518

-v-

EUGENE AJ.'WREINI,
Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF

APPEaA~n

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE
DISTRICT COuRT OF CARBON
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE ERNEST F. BALDWIN
JR., PRESIDING.

PHIL L. HANSEN
HANSEN AND ~~SEN
Attorney for Appellant
800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RCBERT B. HANSEN
At ar~ey for Respondent
2J State Capitol
Sa t Lake City, Utah 84114
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUPPLEHENTAL STATEHENT OF FACTS ........................ 1
ARGUHENT
I:
THE DENIAL OF APPELL&~T'S RIGHT
TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS IS REVERSIBLE
ERROR .................................... 2

II.

A.

THE CLAIH IS SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD AND BY AFFIDAVIT ............... 2

B.

APPELLANT HAS SHOWN THAT THESE
DEPOSITIONS WERE NECESSARY AND
THAT THE DENIAL WAS PREJUDICIAL ....... 2

APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
HAS BEEN DENIED SINCE CROSS-EXAHU:iA':'I':<'c
WAS IHPROPERLY LIHITED.............
.. 6

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
AFFIDAVIT OF TRIAL JUDGE .............................. 13
CASES CITED
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 42 L.Ed. 568,577,
18S.Ct.l83(1897) ..............................
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) .............
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1976)..................
Oberg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P. 2d 229 (1947)...
State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977) ...........
State v. Smelser, 13 Utah 2d 347, 463 P.2d 562 (1970).
State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953).....
United States v. Alford, 282 U.S. 687 (1930) ..........
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 Utah
2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6
7
7
8
9
9
8
8
9

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §77-45-20 (1971).......................

-i-

2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

)
)

EUGENE ANDREINI,

Case No. 16518

)

Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following statement of facts is provided to
clarify the questions arising from respondent's Brief at
pages 5 and 9.

These facts, as developed below, will

serve to demonstrate how the appellant was prejudiced by
the states' depositions, and how he was injured by his
inability to respond to them.
On September 11, 1978, before the preliminary hearing
and before the trial in the instant action, the Carbon County
Attorney's Office deposed several witnesses, among them,
William Robertson, William Crissman, and Ken Oviatt. Evidently,
the Carbon County Attorney Office acted under the authority
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the Utah Code Ann.

s

77-45-20 (1971), which states

in substance that the County Attorney shall have the
right, upon application to the District Court for good
cause shown, to subpoena witnesses and depose them.

ThE

attorney for the witnesses shall be notified of such
deposing so he can be present.

Such depositions were

taken but never was application made to the District Coc
by the County Attorney, nor was good cause shown.

Also,

no notice of taking depositions was sent to defendant m
his counsel, nor were any of the witnesses allowed to cc
sult an attorney or have one present during the depositi
I

THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO TAKE
DEPOSITIONS IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
A

THE CLAIH IS SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD AND BY AFFIDAVIT.
As the attached affidavit of the trial judge inct
the motion to take deposition was made at the beginning
the trial and was denied by Judge Baldwin.

The motion \·:

made in open court the morning of the trial, before the
trial judge and opposing counsel.
B

APPELLANT HAS SHO~l THAT THESE
DEPOSITIONS \,'ERE NECESSARY .-'.ND TtL\T
THE DENIAL 1•.JAS PREJVDICIAL.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As was already stated in appellant's brief on
pages 4 thru 7, such a ruling by the trial court judge
was reversible error.

Even Rule 8l(e) U.R.C.P. was not

designed to deprive a defendant of his constitutional
rights.
What respondent states regarding defendant's right
to take a deposition under Section I (B) of his brief
applies equally well to the prosecution.

Never once die

the prosecution make application to the district court to
take these depositions.

Never once did the prosecution

show any good cause for the taking of depositions, nor made
any allegations that the witnesses to be deposed were ill,
about to die or about to leave the court's jurisdiction.
Since there was total statutory non-compliance by the
prosecution, why should they be allowed to profit thereby,
i.e. being able to wave

the defective depositions over

the heads of the witnesses with threats of impeachment and
perjury to coerce them to tell what the prosecution thinks
is true.

The defendant certainly never did obtain that

kind of an advantage.
The denial to take the depositions was prejudicial
for the above reasons as well as the fact that defendant
\vas denied that opportunity.

The defendant was never able

to threaten any of the prosecution's witnesses with impeachment or perjury.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent's brief delves into the right of
defendant to take depositions under prescribed conditions.
That brief overlooks the way in which the law was violatec
by the prosecution as it relates to depositions.
To allow respondent to violate the law and profit
thereby, yet not afford an opportunity to defendant to
equalize the effects of that violation operates as a prejudice against defendant.
The effects of violation are unmeasured, yet the
unlawful 'Ln:Z'luence •.vas there.

The effect of the prosecu-

tion's ex parte deposition was to support and to compel.
To suggest, because the prosecution controlled the line

o:

questioning, they were not interested in exculpatory
evidence.
Certainly, the deponents must have been aware of
the state's adversarial position to defendant; therefore,
they must have felt induced to cooperate.

Also, no one

was there, other than the prosecution, to voir dire or
cross-examine the witnesses, which would have helped assu:
that the witnesses did not respond inaccurately or

inco~

pletely to the enthusiastic, one-sided questions of the
prosecution.

Naturally, the aspects of recollection favo:

able to the state's case would have been reinforced.
all other recollection was not.
-4-
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HhL

Once the witnesses made these statements under
oath, the witnesses were "locked in" to their testimony.
That coupled with the last minute threat of the prosecution,
would have made it so they could not afford to admit error
in their recollection.

They could no longer feel free to

respond according to their contemporaneous, spontaneous
recollection of facts as presented during the trial.

The

effect of the above compulsion was to "chill" their testim::my
-to thwart a full disclosure of the facts at both the
preliminary hearing and the trial, as well as affecting their
demeanor by causing them to appear more apprehensive and less
confident; thus, less credible.
This immeasurable impact of the prior sworn testimony
falls directly upon defendant.

These witnesses were his -

they comprised his case in chief; therefore, any "chilling"
effect fell directly upon the merits of the defense.

Further,

by threatening these witnesses, the prosecution stepped over
I

the line of fair play and conscionable conduct expected of
a public officer in pursuit of truth, creating reversible
prejudice.
Confronted by this coercive situation, the defense
requested of the court permission to depose the witnesses
in order to assume a "balance" at trial.

The court denied

the motion, despite the fact that it was fully aware of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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prior ex parte depositions.

This was reversible error.

Speaking of confessions, but relative and analago,_
to the facts presented by this case is the statement in
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 42 L.Ed. 568, 577, 11
S.Ct. 183 (1897): "[F]or the law cannot measure the force
of the influence used, or decide upon it's effect upon thE
mind of the [witnesses], and therefore [should] exclude
the [depositions and their impeachment purpose] if any
degree of influence has been exerted."
II

A?PELLANT'S RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION HAS BEEN
DENIED SINCE CROSS-EXAMINATION WAS IMPROPERLY
LIMITED.
At trial, defense counsel was curtailed from conducting a thorough cross-examination at several points.
trial judge sustained the prosecution's objections at' sever
points that the questions were irrelevant and argumentati
To the contrary, the defendant was attempting to elicit
responses highly material to the defense, and the trial
court's denial of such cross-examination constituted reve:
sib le error.
In United States v. Alford, 282 U.S. 687 (1930)
the United States Supreme Court held that a denial of

re~

able latitude in cross-examination '.vas prejudicial error'
-6-
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that it was not necessary to show that the cross-examination,
if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending
to discredit the testimony in chief.
415 U.S. 308 (1976)

In Davis v. Alaska,

the United States Supreme Court stated

that denial of the right of effective cross-examination was
contitutional error of the

fi~st

magnitude which no amount

of showing of want of prejudice could cure.
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)

And in Chapman

the court held that if

there is a denial of the right of confrontation of the
principal witness(es) against the defendant, the conviction
must be reversed unless the appellate court can state beyond
a reasonable doubt that no prejudice occurred.

(Emphasis

added) .
This court has recognized the value of cross-examination many times in the past.

As stated in Weber Basin Water

Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862
(1959), the purpose of cross-examination is to give adversary
counsel the opportunity not only to inquire into uncertainties
pertaining to the testimony in chief, but to inquire into
credibility; and whatever may make plain, modify or contradict the evidence should be allowed.

Even though the trial

court generally has discretion to control cross-examination
within reasonable limitations, he may not so reject it so
to prevent inquiry into matter having a direct bearing on

-7-
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the issued.

Again in Oberg v. Sanders, lll Utah 507, 18

p. 2d 229 (1947)

this court reaffirmed the above by stat:

that the testimony of a witness is no stronger than wher;
it is left on cross-examination.

In the preceding cases

as well as many others, this court has reversed the deci:
of the trial court based upon the improper restrictions
exacted upon trial counsel in his pursuit of a full eros
examination.
(1953).

See State v. Peek, l Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d

Appellant maintains that in the case at bar sue

restr:.:::::.:.::-.ns as were Dlaced upon defense counsel constit.
reversible error.
Respondent, in his brief at 9, avers that the ques:
posited to the state's chief witness were irrelevant anc
argumentative.

To the contrary, trial counsel was direc:

his questions to the witness in order to establish facts
inferences of merit.

Counsel was attempting to elicit f:

the complaining witness the extent of his injuries, clea:
a material element.to be proven by the state, as well as
the likely cause of the witness' injuries.

(TR 33)

The affirmative defense of self defense would nece
ily involve the state of mind of the victim.

Counsel wa

denied cross-examination designed to expose the fact tha
the witness indeed had exhibited hostility toward the dei
in an encounter with the defendant's wife at the Hollov7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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Bottle prior to the incident involved at trial.

To deny

the defendant the opportunity here to develop his defense
of self defense was clearly reversible error.
Respondent, in his brief, states that the appellant
has a dual burden in establishing reversible error;

that

the error was committed by the trial court; and that such
error resulted in clear prejudice.

Such a conclusion should

be limited to the facts of the case to which respondent
refers.

In that case cited by respondent, State v. Maestas,

564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977) this court cited State v. Smelser,
13 Utah 2d 347, 463 P.2d 562 (1970).

In Smelser, the court

recognized that the information sought to be produced from
the witness was simply cumulative - it had already been
elicited.

Because of that, the court was willing to rule as

a matter of law that the denial of further cross-examination
was not prejudicial.

In Maestas, supra, the same reasoning

was followed by the court - Justice Hall stating: "Courts
have found no prejudice where information that may be brought
out by further questioning was already before the jury, either
from the testimony of others or by implication from the
witness' own testimony".
In the case at hand, the information sought to be
elicited was never before the jury.

Since that information
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was material to the defense, a denial of the same is
reversible error.
Since the gravamen of defendant's case was self
defense, it was necessary for the defense to establish
the state of mind of the victim, his past actions toward
defendant, as well as the amount of force the victim used
which had to be repelled by defendant.

With the trial

court's denial of this particular part of the cross-exami:
ation, defendant was unable to fully develop his defense
of self

~efense.

Such is reversible error.

The complaining witness was able to testify under
direct, the way he wanted; however, by denying defendant
the effective right of cross-examination, the complainant
testimony went unchallenged.

CONCLUSION
The attached affidavit of Judge Baldwin should al.
any argument that a proper record of the defendant motion
was not before this reviewing court.

The motion was made

and denied as is now attested to by Judge Baldwin.
The effect of the trial judge's denial of defense'
motion to take depositions was highly prejudicial to defe
in that defendant was unable to balance out or cure the ::
proper taking of the depositions by the prosecution.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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As

before stated, the prosecution never made proper
application to the district court since no good cause
was shown, i.e., that any of the witnesses were leaving
the jurisdiction, were ill or about to die, etc.

The

witnesses did not have their attorneys available or present.
Defense was never notified of the taking of the depositions;
hence, were unable to effectively counter the same.

The

fact of the unlawful dspositions coupled with the threats
made by the prosecution on the eve of trial had a "chilling"
effect upon defendant's witnesses' testimony.

The influence

there was immeasurable; hence the trial judge's denial
should be reversed.
The denial of defendant's right to effectively crossexamine the complainant prejudiced him in that defendant was
effectively denied the right to develop his affirmative
defense of self defense.

Such denial vitiated any fair trial

to which defendant was entitled.

Defendant, under his rights

guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution as well as the Utah
Constitution, is entitled to develop fully any potential
defenses he has in a criminal trial.

This he was prohibited

from doing.
For the above stated reasons, Appellant urges this
Court to reverse the conviction rendered in the court below.
-11-
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DATED this 27th day of August, 1980.
Respectfully Submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
HANSEN .AND HANSEN

}c

~r
By

J±:

',L-

~~c

);

I

I

I ·~..L(

'/"

Attorneys o'r Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I delivered a true and cor
copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to the
Attorney General at the State Capitol Building on this

1.-'jt~ day of August, 1980.
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ADDENDUM
AFFIDAVIT OF TRIAL JUDGE
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, being first duly sworn deposes
and says:
l.

That he was the presiding trial judge in the

trial of State of Utah vs. Eugene Andreini, held in the
District Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, on April
24 and 25, 1979.

c.i~
That the attorney for defendant, Phil L. Hansen,
~ 7Ld~ ~ -;::;£· .. ..t.. -·~ ~"1!7· c
<..... ~
in the morning of April 'l4, 1980,11 made a motion before affian~"c?
2.

to take the depositions of the potential witnesses involved
in the case.
3.

That affiant denied defendant's motion to take

the deposition of witnesses.
DATED this

:2 .;-

STATE OF UTAH

w. STiillt.l~e E'V.A~:s

ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

BY~~~~~~~~

SUBSCRIBED TO AND SWORN before me this __~-August, 1980.
Hy Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in Salt
Lake County
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